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TWO THEORIES OF VALUE 1N MEDIEVAL ISLAM 
Among the debates conducted in Islamic intellectual circles in the 
early cAbb?isid period, one of the most significant was the debate about 
the nature of value. To simplify the situation a little, we may say that 
two main theories opposed each. other. One was that of the Muctazila, 
that values such as justice and goodness have a real existence, in- 
dependent of anyone’s will, even God’s: this view is classed as “ob- 
jectivism.” The other theory was that of Ashcari and his like, that 
all values are determined by the will of God, who decides what shall 
be just and so forth : this will be called “theistic subjectivism.” Follow- 
ing a struggle between the two doctrines, that of AshCari finally 
prevailed in most learned circles of medieval Sunnite Islam, a result 
which had far-reaching consequences in law and other spheres of 
Islamic civilization. As far as the writer is aware, no one has yet 
examined as a separate problem the reasons why the AshCarite theory 
of value prevailed. 
The primary philosophical question about value can be stated broadly 
thus : What is the common element in all that is called “good,” “right,” 
etc? This question includes the more specific ones of ethics: What 
constitutes a right action? and, How do we know the right action? 
At the outset the discussion will be carried on in terms of the broader 
question of value, because no less than this was made an issue among 
the Muslim theologians; at a later stage it will be appropriate to speak 
in terms of ethics. First of all it is necessary to go briefly over the 
meaning and history of the two broad theories that opposed each other. 
By “objectivism” we mean any theory which affirms that value has 
a real existence in particular things or acts, regardless of the wishes 
or opinions of any judge or observer as such. (Objectivism is not 
necessarily absolutist; in fact most objectivist theories include a certain 
type of relativism. To take a material example, if we say that light 
clothing is better in a warm climate and thick clothing in a cold one, 
we are saying that each kind of clothing has a real objective advantage 
relative to a particular climate, and not merely a conventional accep- 
tability or a subjective attractiveness to some people.) Objectivism in 
one form or another has been the prevailing view of western thought 
before the twentieth century. Socrates affirmed it when he convinced 
Euthyphro that piety is loved by the gods because it is good in itself; 
it is not made good by the mere fact that the gods love it. This was 
the view developed by Plato and Aristotle into the theory of the 
rational good, then upheld by the Stoics and most of the Catholic 
philosophers in the doctrine of natural right. In  modern times Kant 
and other intuitionists, the utilitarians and some other naturalists, have 
all accepted the objectivity of value while differing about everything 
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else. I t  may be termed th.e classical tradition of Europe, although 
there are exceptions. In Islam objectivism was upheld both by the 
philosophers, who were the full inheritors of the Greek tradition, and 
before them by the Muctazila, who came under some Greek influence. 
Most of the MuCtazila asserted that there is a real good, which God 
wishes for the world, and a real justice which He upholds; and further 
that man can know what these are in specific instances by his reason. 
The name “subjectivism” applies to any theory to the effect that 
the value of things or acts is always determined solely by the opinions 
or emotional attitudes of some judge or observer. In ancient Greece, 
many of the sophists put forward a social or conventional subjecti- 
vism: thus, what is called “justice” in a particular society is deter- 
mined only by the opinions of the rulers, or of the majority. Similar 
types of theory have become fashionable in our age; they are “sophis- 
ticated” in a sense that is not always fully understood. In  medieval 
Islam, however, subjectivism took a form which. seems remote from 
the view of the sophists, though there is an underlying relation which 
was recognized by the acute mind of Ibn Rushd. 1 This was theisric 
subjectivism, the belief that “good,” “right” and similar terms have 
no other meaning than “that which God wills” : thus God makes things 
good or right for us by His decision that they should be so. I t  is denied 
that these words denote anything that has an objective existence; 
their meaning applies only to whatever God wishes, decrees or ap- 
proves for the world. (This doctrine is also called “ethical volun- 
tarism,” but “theistic subjectivism” describes more closely the place 
of the theory in a logical classification of theories of value). This was 
the theory of value held by AshCari and all AshCarites, including Gha- 
zili. I t  is not peculiar to Islam, since it occurs in medieval Judaism 
and occasionally in western thought; but it was probably more prom- 
inent and widespread in Islam than in any other civilization. 
The prevalence of theistic subjectivism in Islam may appear sur- 
prising, i f  we judge it merely on its merits as a theory of value. 
Objectivism of one type or another may be thought more “natural” 
to man, in the sense that it has been more widespread in history and 
seems implied by most value language as it is used spontaneously 
and uninfluenced by theories. These matters cannot be argued here, 
but it is relevant to mention that in medieval Islam, too, objectivism 
was not without widespread support, both implicit in the practice of 
early Muslims and explicit in the writings of many distinguished theo- 
logians and philosophers. Some serious objections to theistic subjec- 
tivism were voiced, such as this consequence of i t :  that if God had 
commanded theft and idolatry, it would have been ips0 facto righ,t for 
JdmG nui baCd al-tabica, in Ras~iU Ibn Rwhd (Hyderabad, I947), p. 172. 
After criticizing the AshCarite theory of value he concludes : “All these are views 
like those of Protagoras”. Cf. Averroes’ commentary MI Pluto’s Republic, Heb. 
ed. and Eng. tr. E. I. J. Rosenthal (Cambridge, rg56), I, xi, 3. 
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man to commit them. Ashcar& Ibn Hazm and Ghazdi did not shrink 
from accepting this extreme consequence; 2 but a philosopher like Ibn 
Rushd could well point out how such a position would undermine 
faith in God and belief in ordinary morality. 3 
When, on the other hand, we look at the two theories in the context 
of early Islamic thought, the triumph of Ashcari’s theory seems almost 
inevitable, given the way in which Islam was generally understood in 
those times. The rest of this article will be devoted to explaining why 
th.is was so, in medieval Sunnite Islam. Three kinds of reason may 
be found, which can be classified as ethical, theological and extraneous. 
The first will be dealt with at greatest length. 
In dealing with the ethical reason we have to start from the history 
of Islamic jurisprudence before the time of Ashcari. Here the Muslims 
faced a question of practical ethics which was more immediate than 
any philosophical question about ethics or value in general, namely : 
From what sources can a judge or mufti find out in all circumstances 
what is the right action? The starting points were, of course, the 
Qur’Hn and Traditions, and by the middle of the eighth century of 
the Christian era it was agreed that duties explicitly laid down in them 
were known from those sources. The question that remained, then, 
was how duties and right actions were to be determined when they 
were not mentioned in the Qur’in or Traditions. We may classify 
the answers into two main types, omitting many variations and details 
which need not concern us here. 
I )  On one side were lawyers who practised and allowed ijtihdd 
al-ra’y, the exercise of independent personal judgment in cases where 
the revealed sources did not contain explicit guidance. This was common 
practice in the ancient law schools of Madina and CIr5q, which left 
their influence particularly on the classical schools of the two imams 
Milik and Abii Hanifa. “When it (ra’y) reflects the personal choice 
of the lawyer, guided by his idea of appropriateness, it is called 
islitisan or istihbab, preference.’ The term istihsdn therefore came to 
signify a breach of strict analogy for reasons of public interest, con- 
venience or similar considerations.” * 
The ethical basis which might justify such a practice may have 
remained unarticulated in the law schools; but Mdtazilite theologians 
supplied a theory of ethics which could support i j t i h d  al-ra’y, if lawyers 
Ashcari, Kitcib al-lumac, in The theology of al-AsltCari, ed. and Eng. tr. 
R. J .  McCarthy (Beirut, 1953), sect. 171; Ibn Ijazm, Kitcib al-fisal fil-milal, 
Leitlen Warner MS. 480, Fol. 200a, quoted in I. Goldziher, Die Zcicihiriten 
(Leipzig, 1884), pp. 163-64 ; GhazPli, Al-iqtipid fil-ictiqdd (Cairo, TijLriya Press, 
1st e d ,  n.d.), pp. 81-82. 
Jam$ nici baCd al-tabica, p. 172; Kitcib al-kashf Can mandhtj al-adilla, ed. 
M. J. Muller, in Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes (Munich, 1859), p. 113. 
J. Schacht, The oiigins of Muhammadan jurisprudence (Oxford, 1750). 
PP. 98-99. 
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wished to avail themselves of it. This was the theory that there is an 
objective good, including a real public interest and a real justice, and 
that these could be recognized by human reason, Caql. The process of 
recognition involved can be termed “moral judgment,” to distinguish 
it from other types of personal judgment. Ra’y, th,erefore, might have 
been restricted to moral judgment as described, and justified on that 
basis. 
I t  might be supposed that all lawyers would have welcomed the 
latitude allowed them by a system in which judgments of public interest 
and equity would have been given an authorized position. But it appears 
that the attitude of legal theorists was in general dominated by fears 
that this latitude would be misused. Two dangers might be anticipated. 
One was that yaJy would be employed arbitrarily by caliphs, governors 
and other administrative officials exercising judicial powers. Very 
significant in this context is the rejection, in the early years of the 
CAbbasids, of Ibn al-MuqaffaC’s theory that the caliph alone has the 
right to exercise raJy, and that he may use it to modify and codify 
Islamic law. 5 Acceptance of th.is proposition would have opened a 
valuable way to evolution of that law to cope with changing conditions. 
But from the lawyers’ viewpoint Ibn al-MuqaffaC was offering the 
worst of two worlds, for he was both withdrawing raJy from theni- 
selves and allowing it to the chief executive. Thus they rejected it; 
probably they felt that a law based squarely on the Qur%n and 
Traditions alone would serve a more vital purpose, by acting as a 
constitutional check on rulers and preserving Islamic standards in 
public life, 
The other danger came from the side of Shicism. If raJy were allowed, 
the opinions of ordinary lawyers were fallible. Th.is would make 
more attractive the idea of a living authority, such as a ShiCite imam, 
who could give an infallible opinion. We know that much later, around 
1100, Ghaziili was acutely aware of this possibility as a threat to the 
Sunnite community, and his answer rings out clear in refutations 
of the Biitiniya: there is no need for a living imcim; the ilndnz of the 
Muslims is Muhammad, and all ethical and legal questions can be 
answered from the Qur% and Traditions6 Now Ghaziili was a 
Shaficite, and his ShafiCite ideas on law were perfect for answering 
Shicites. 7 Whether this purpose was in the mind of Sh5fiCi three 
See S. D. Goitein, “A turning-point in the history of the Muslim state,” 
Islamic Culture 23 (rwg),  pp. 120-35. 
Al-Mustaghiri, = FadGJih al-Bcitiniya, extracts and summary in I. Goldziher, 
Streitschrift des Gazdi gegen die Bdjinijja-Sekte (Leiden, 1916) ; Al-qistas al- 
mustaqim, in Al-jawahin al-ghawdli (Cairo, 1g34), p. 156 f f . ;  and especially Al- 
munqidh min al-dalil, ed. J. Salibi and K. CAyyHd, 3rd ed. (Damascus, I939), 
p. I11  f f .  ‘ The passage in Mwqidh referred to in note 6 follows closely the arguments 
of Shifici’s Risala justifying ijtihad al-qiyds. See below, pp. 6-8, on Sh5fiCi. 
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centuries before is another question, which could only be answered 
by discovering reactions of ShlIfiCi to Shicism. 8 
Quite apart from its lack of adoption by the legal profession, the 
Mu‘tazilite theory of ethics had a weakness of its own. An objectivist 
ethical philosophy ought to be able to show how moral judgment 
operates and to indicate the possibility of its being reasonable, if not 
scientific. But here the MuCtazila failed, and their failure was almost 
inevitable at the stage in the history of religion and philosophy at 
which they lived. Aristotle had suggested that practical reason is direct- 
ed by an end, the real good for man, but he had disappointingly not 
made clear what this right end is for a society, except for a few in- 
dividuals who might find their fulfillment in the life of the intellect 
or the spirit. For Muslims, an end was indicated which applied to 
everyone, namely eternal happiness, al-sa%dat al-ukhrciwiya. This 
suggests that the Muctazila might have developed a utilitarian type of 
ethics along the following lines: the end or interest (mqlaha) of the 
Muslim community consists in the happiness of as many as possible 
in the next life; right action is that which promotes this end. But 
here they faced a theoretical gap between means and end which does 
not disturb a more worldly utilitarianism. It  is possible to some extent 
to discover by empirical reason what produces happiness in an earthly 
society, and to see the causal relation between the means and the end. 
But where the goal is happiness in an after-life, given as a reward 
for a certain way of life on earth, the utilitarian formula throws no 
light on the practical means, the particulars of right conduct, for there 
is no intelligible relation between the cause (certain kinds of action) 
and the effect (the reward of bliss in the next life). 
Moreover, even apart from its relation to the effect, the cause in 
itself could not be understood as having a single objective character. 
This was because the shazaricu, or scripture regarded as a code of law, 
gave no unifying ethical principle to explain what is common to fasting, 
almsgiving, dealing just weight, etc., other than the fact of being 
commanded by God. Consequently a Muslim seeking guidance for 
an Islamic life on issues where the commands are not explicit or appear 
to conflict would find no rational method to follow, except the method 
W e  can trace the opposition between Tradition and the call for an imdm 
a t  least as far back as Khayy5.t in the early tenth century. The following passage 
is worth quoting : “The doctrine that unbroken Tradition (at-khnbar al-?ttztta;cdtir) 
is true and that it compels knowledge destroys most of the proof of the Rfifidn 
in affirming the imamate. That is because one of their chief proofs, in their 
own eyes, that people must have an infallible inutnz, pure within and without. 
uniting all the sciences of religion, is that all the rest of the community besides 
him is liable to carelessness.. .”: Kitab al- int i~dr,  ed. H. S. Nyberg and Fr .  
tr. A. N. Nader (Beirut, 1957), sect. 103. Conversely, the IsmZCili qadi Nucni5ii 
in the tenth century was denying the efficacy of qiycis because he knew that 
without it the Sunnite (“Traditional”) theory of law would break (low1 : 
DacdJim al-Zslam, ed. A. A. A. Fyzee (Cairo, 195I), I, p. 103 ff.,  quoted in 
B. Dodge, “The Fiitimid legal code”, Mwlim World 50 (Jan. I ~ o ) ,  pp. 30-38. 
274 THE MUSLIM WORLD 
of analogy with what is commanded, and this is exactly that qiyds 
which was recommended by the opponents of ya’y. 9 
Lastly we may ask whether the sacred texts of Islam themselves 
gave any encouragement to an objectivist theory of value. This is a 
question which really requires a separate investigation; only a few 
general remarks may be made here. Certainly the Qur’iin often refers 
to values, such as al-islah, “doing good,” which may easily be under- 
stood in an objective sense. I t  also urges man to think for himself, 
and such thought could be taken to include independent moral judg- 
ment. Then there are Traditions like the much-quoted answer of 
MucSdh Ibn Jabal to the Prophet’s question as to how he would decide 
cases in the absence of a text from God or the Prophet: “Then I 
shall use my own judgment (ajtahidu ra’yi).” Unfortunately for the 
theory under discussion, no text gave unequivocal support to it; even 
itihcid in the Tradition quoted was interpreted by ShHfi‘i as zj’tihdd 
al-qiycis, not involving independent moral opinion. 10 Meanwhile the 
quotations on the other side were more clear-cut, as will be shown. 
2) The legal opponents of independent judgment were those who 
insisted that every decision must be justified by texts from the Qur’gn 
or the Traditions or by the implications of such texts as determined by 
qiyds, “reasoning by analogy.” On this side we must count the ShafiCites 
and the Zshirites: 11 these two groups differed on the legitimate 
methods, but they were at one on the fundamental principle of not 
allowing independent judgment. Now, corresponding to each weakness 
&own above in the position of the supporters of ra’y, we find a 
point of strength on the side of the partisans of textual authority (%ass). 
From the viewpoint of legal practice it looked like an advantage to 
be able to construct a complete positive law, which would provide for 
every judgment the solid authority of texts and their implications. The 
original Divine Law of the scriptures was like a regional map, with 
the roads well marked within the limits of the region. As jurisprudence 
is a science which aims to be precise and does not mind being slow, 
the ideal of most lawyers of medieval Islam was to construct a series 
of such maps, to cover the entire world of possible action. 
I n  the field of ethical theory, the ShafiCites and allied legal schools 
had a neat position: that right action could always be known from 
revelation or by legitimate extensions of it. Beyond that they did not 
~ ~~ 
Christian ethics follows a different course, because it is not a detailed set 
of laws but principles based primarily on the injunction to love God and to 
love one’s neighbor, as expressed, for example, in Luke 10 : 27. These principles 
provide a method of judgment which can be applied in any moral situation. 
Thus analogies from the life of Christ do not have the same place in Christianity 
as qiycis in classical Islamic law. 
lo Kitcib al-umm (BulHq, 1321-25 = I93-07), vii, p. 273. 
l1 The founder of the TPhiriya, DPwfid ibn Khalaf, was at  first a Shaficite. 
His doctrine carried the main theoretical tendency of ShPfiCi to an extreme, 
by ruling out even qiyds as a source of legal knowledge. See Goldziher, Zcihiriten, 
pp. 27 f f .  
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need to go, though there are hints of a theory of value in some state- 
ments by ShifiCi and early theologians. 12 
In  the Qur’5n Sh5fici found many quotations to support a theory 
of positive law : for instance, references to the Book as hudfi, guidance, 
and passages associating the guidance of the sunna of the Prophet 
with the judgments of the Book, or associating obedience to the 
Prophet with obedience to God. He attached key importance to the 
sentence, “Does man reckon that he shall be left to roam at random 
( p t r a k a  Sudan) ?”, taking it to refer to man’s moral situation. 13 But 
far more potent than explicit statements was the example of the Book’s 
own practice. The QurJ2n contains a number of injunctions that are 
clearly of legislative force and are stated as divine commands, pro- 
hibitions, permissions and so on. But these injunctions cover only a 
fraction of the spheres of conduct, whereas “al-Islam” means sur- 
render of the human will to God’s guidance in all spheres. Therefore, 
it was thought, God could not have left man without guidance in the 
remaining spheres-and this guidance can be expected to take the same 
form in principle as the explicit guidance of the QurJanic legislation. 
This last step was fatally easy, especially in view of the failure of 
reason as a guide. In short, the prestige of the Qur5n  led to the 
search for other positive sources to extend the scope of the sharica. 14 
Having these advantages, the ShafiCite principles prevailed in the 
classical theory of Islamic law which became consolidated in the course 
of the ninth century of the Christian era. The victory was qualified 
by one or two major concessions to opposing views; but it was none 
the less a victory, as we may see from the classical procedure of qiyas 
which is designed to exclude as far as possible any element of in- 
dependent judgment. 
Now we must notice that the ShafiCite theory of scriptural authority 
as the basis for all legal and ethical knowledge would naturally support 
a theory of value like theistic subjectivism, which claims that right 
and wrong have no meaning but the will of God. The theory of value 
is not quite a logical implication of the theory of knowledge, for it 
la ShPfici, Risala, ed. A. M. ShPkir (Cairo, 1g10), p. 2 5 :  “Justice is obedience 
to God”; p. 33, quotes QurJZn (Cairo) xxi, 23, “He shall not be questioned as to 
what H e  does’’. Ashcari, Muqdkit al-Isl&nlyin, ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, Ig29), 
p. 191: JaCfar ibn Barb taught that God has willed that unbelief should be evil. 
1s QurJBn Ixxv, 36, quoted by Shtifici, Risda, p. 25. and Kitcib al-zlmm vii, 
p. 271. In the latter passage Shiifici claims the support of all authorities in 
understanding “sudun” as “what is neither commanded nor forbidden”. This 
interpretation seems to read too much into the text, since the context concerns 
only the inevitability of the gathering of all men at  the resurrection. More im- 
pressive is QurJgn v, 41-50, with its refrain “So judge between them according 
to what God has sent down”. 
The same development took place in the history of Judaism, in which the 
oral law of the rabbis, and later the Talmud, grew up to supplement the limited 
commands of the Torah. W e  must not attribute the similarity directly to any 
inherited Semitic way of thinking; it is rather a seemingly logical outcome of 
the character of a Semitic scripture. 
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is theoretically possible to hold that an objective right exists but that 
we can only know its practical applications through scripture. How- 
ever, it is doubtful whether anyone held such a view. Certainly the 
Shaficites would be delighted to dispose of objective values, for this 
would cut the ground completely froin under the feet of their adver- 
saries, and leave the supposed “independent moral judgment” as 
nothing but idle fancy, as zann based on a h 2 .  And since law and 
theology were so closely connected in the education of the Culamti’, 
the prevalence of Shafi‘ite ideas of law prepared the way thoroughly 
for the the later spread of the hsh‘arite theory of value. I t  is not 
accidental that th,ree of the greatest AshCarite theologians, Ashcari, 
Juwayni and Ghaziili, were all ShafiCites 15 and that Ibn Hazm was 
a Ziihirite. 
The theological reasons for the triumph of Ash‘arite subjeciivisin 
can be stated quite briefly. All of them are implications of God’s 
omnipotence. The overwhelming power of God is greatly emphasized 
in the Qur’Pn, so that it became the primary fact of religion for one 
broad school of thought, the self-styled ah1 al-sunna who were the op- 
ponents of the MuCtazila and the forerunners of Ashcarisin. For them 
theistic subjectivism served three invaluable ends, and solved problems 
that might otherwise have arisen from the divine omnipotence. 
I )  Man seems powerful and clever when compared with the rest 
of visible creation. But the vast superiority of God can best be shown 
by contrast with man’s real feebleness. As one aspect of the contrast, 
theologians of this school were disposed to stress, negatively that man 
is ignorant of any principles of ethics, and positively that God’s will 
is the source that defines the right for man. Such doctrines would 
bring out man’s utter dependence on God’s help, through the sharPa. 
2) In relation to God, objective values appeared as a limiting factor 
to His power to do as He  wills. The Mu‘tazila discussed whether 
He  could do evil if H e  chose. Nazzlni said H e  could not, because 
justice is of the essence of His acts: this was logical for a Muctazilite, 
but it seemed to limit God’s power. Others said God could do evil, 
but H e  would never do it, because of what H e  is-an answer which 
did not avoid contradiction, as Khayylt pointed out. 16 Ash‘ari got 
rid of the whole embarrassing problem by denying the existence of 
objective values which might act as a standard for God’s action. By 
defining “justice” as obedience to the commands of a law, he set God 
15. See Ibn CAsikir, Tabrin kadhib nl-nzuftari, ed. 13. Qudsi (Damascus, 
1928-29), p. 140, Eng. tr.  R. J. McCarthy, The theology of al-AslaCari, pp. 
167-68 : “The ShafiCites followed the doctrine of al-AshCari and composed works 
agreeing with it.” 
l6 Inti$@, sect. 10: “When Ibn al-RZwandi was asked, ‘Do you deny that He 
actually does what you have described Him as capable of doing?’, he answered, 
‘That is impossible and absurd.’ ” 
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free from the ethical limits that confine man, for “the Lord of the 
worlds ... is not under a sharica.” 17 
3) The same answer conveniently solved the awkward problem of 
evil. There was an evident contradiction between the assertion that 
God is absolutely omnipotent, predestining man’s good and evil acts 
and then punishing them for the evil ones, and the assertion that 
God is just in the sense we normally understand. AshCari and his 
school preferred to stand by omnipotence and throw out justice in 
the ordinary sense. This could be done i f  human justice were defined 
in terms of law, since again “the Lord of the worlds ... is not under a 
shuriCa”-therefore “He is not foolish,” when He wills folly in man. 18 
Lastly, it is necessary to mention a chain of extraneous events having 
no particular connection with theories of value, namely the general 
defeat of the MuCtazila in the ninth century. The main issue on which 
they met their downfall was the question of the creation of the Qur’Ln. 
But their defeat on this point need not have involved a general decline 
if they themselves had not unwisely brought politics into theology a 
generation earlier. By accepting the official backing of the Caliph 
MaJmin and encouraging the persecution of their opponents as “un- 
orth,odox,” they gambled with the risk of a reversal of the persecution, 
and this came to pass at the hands of Mutawakkil. Their opponents 
were too numerous and too steadfast, and, led by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, 
they held out until the tide turned. The persecution of the MuCtazila 
in their turn was part of a conservative movement in Islam, perhaps 
a “failure of nerve,” 19 led by the Caliph himself who was having 
trouble with his Turkish guards and tried to appeal beyond them to 
the broad support of the ah1 al-sunna. Thus the check to MuCtazilite 
ideas on value was to some extent just part of their misfortunes as 
a whole, but this did not reduce the seriousness of the consequences 
in the controversy about values. Henceforward any objections to their 
value theory would strike all the more sharply because they were now 
a minority sect under the disapproval of the ‘Abbasid state. 
In explaining within a limited space the dominance of one theory, 
this article has unavoidably been one-sided in dwelling more upon the 
weaknesses of one party and the strength of the other. I t  has been the 
writer’s intention to show that the result was due to powerful forces 
in medieval Sunnite Islam, but not to show that it was a necessary 
product of Islam itself. For modern Muslims, what has been written 
has a certain relevance because they face essentially the same problem 
l7 Al-ibdna ‘an u$ul al-diydna, in Al-RasdJil al-sabca (sic) fil-CaqdJid (Hy- 
Ibid. 
G. Murray, Five stages of Greek religion (London, 1g35), ch. 4 referring 
derahad, 1948), p. 54. 
to later Greek religion. 
278 THE MUSLIM WORLD 
about value as their medieval predecessors. But the interest of the 
medieval solution lies less in any immediate acceptance that it may re- 
ceive today than in its resemblances and contrasts with what Muslims 
of our time are likely to think. I t  is doubtful that many of them will 
return to a pure AshCarite theory of value, but it is hoped that a de- 
tached study of the origins of that theory will assist some Muslims and 
some non-Muslims to clarify their thoughts on value in its relation 
to Islam. 
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